Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg
↪ FRIBIS - Freiburg Institute for Basic Income Studies ↪ FRIBIS

Marcel Franke

Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter und Doktorand                                                                                            

Mail: marcel.franke@vwl.uni-freiburg.de
Tel.: +49 – (0)761 – 203-2320
Raum: 03011 Rempartstraße 16
Sprechzeiten: nach Vereinbarung

Dissertationsvorhaben:

Markets are a powerful tool for providing economic efficiency. Therefore, organizing economic interactions via markets increases a society’s total wealth. However, markets are not profound for generating fair results. Indeed, markets tend to produce highly unequal results, including absolute poverty which may be socially unacceptable. Universal basic income (UBI) stems from the idea of humanitarianism and elimination of absolute poverty. It enforces the economic liberty to be provided with the necessary goods without active participation in the economy, no matter the reason.
While the ability to refrain from the labor market may stand in contrast to the politics of economic growth, it does not necessarily violate Pareto-efficiency. Rather, UBI clashes with market-liberal strands in its demand for financing. The perspective that ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’ structures the economic realm via scarcity. Thus, the economic perspective focuses on the tradeoff of benefits via a UBI and its costs. ‘Costs’ mean taxation in a governmental redistribution program, such as UBI, revealing the essential point of stress between markets and UBI. Taxation is forcefully taking away the property of citizens, while markets require a strong government enforcing and guaranteeing the preconditions of personal rights, property rights, and economic security.
While this area of conflict contains plenty of questions for research, I follow the straightforward approach of Pareto-efficiency.

Lehrerfahrung:

  • Laufende Betreuung von Bachelor- und Masterarbeiten mit unterschiedlichen Schwerpunkten seit SS 17
  • WS 17/18 bis 22/23 Übung in Economics of Social Justice
  • WS 20/21 bis 22/23 Betreuung von Studierenden im Seminar „Grundprobleme des bedingungslosen Grundeinkommens“
  • SS 19 bis 22 Übung in Public Sector Economics
  • SS 19 bis 22 Organisation des Seminars „Basic Income and Social Justice“
  • SS 17 bis 22 Betreuung von Studentengruppen im Seminar „Basic Income and Social Justice“
  • WS 18/19 Mitwirken an der Übung in Economic Policy and Public Choice
  • WS 17/18 Tutorat und 18/19 Tutorate in Economic Policy and Public Choice
  • SS 17 bis 18 Tutorat in Einführung in die Wirtschaftspolitik
  • SS 17 bis 18 Tutorat in Constitutional Economics
  • WS 14/15 bis 16/17 Tutorate in Management of Information Systems

Forschungsinteressen und Themengebiete:

  • Bedingungsloses Grundeinkommen
  • Staatsphilosophie: insb. Constitutional Economics und Economics of Social Justice
  • Ordnungspolitik

Forschungsprojekte:

  • Mitglied der Basic Income Research Group (BIRG)
  • Synergies from an Integrated Renewable Energy Supply and Storage System in the Upper Rhine Region: An Interdisciplinary Analysis (RES_TMO)
  • FRIBIS Team „Basic Income for Peacebuilding“

Publikationen:

  • Franke, M. (2022). Envy and Blame in the UBI Discussion. Basic Income Studies, aop, 1–33. doi: 10.1515/bis-2021-0035
  • Franke, M., & Jäger, T. (2022). Nash Bargaining with a Social Preference. In B. Neumärker, & J. Schulz (Hrsg.), Financial Issues of a Universal Basic Income (UBI) (Bd. 1). Lit Verlag Berlin, 71–106.
  • Franke, M., & Neumärker, B. (February 2022). A Climate Alliance through Transfer: Transfer Design in an Economic Conflict Model. World, 3, 112–125. doi:10.3390/world3010006

Working paper:

  • Davies, C., Franke, M., Kuang, L., & Neumärker, B. (2022). A Contractarian View on Homann’s Ethical Approach: the Vision of `New Ordoliberalism´. Constitutional Economic Network Papers, 1-23.
  • Franke, M. (2022). Transfer in a Conflict Model as a Reason for (Unconditional) Basic Income. FRIBIS Discussion Paper, 3, 1–22.
  • Franke, M. (2021). Eine Verhandlung zur Selektion der konstitutionenökonomischen Lösung. Constitutional Economic Network Papers, 1–40.

Präsentationen: